The missed [soccer] match

[KL-666]

From 30 minutes fuel you get alarms in the cockpit, and you are obliged to declare an emergency. For this flight that must have started just above Bogota. Yet they neglected the alarms and continued to Medellin. Btw, this ignoring must have been standard procedure at this airline, because they have flown this leg several times before.

I hear now that the airline is grounded. Not really necessary to impose that on an airline with their only flying craft destroyed.

Kind regards, Vincent

[jwocky]

I watched that video. Some of this is inconsistent with the ATC tape. For example, the RJ85 was NOT flying holding patterns, the RJ caem in, declared to be in fuel problems and asked for priority without declaring a formal emergency. Then, the RJ was sent to RNG which is the begin point of the approach, but was still at FL210, so waaayyyy too hiigh for an approach. They had to descend and fast, which is actually for a Jumbolino not so much a problem as for many other planes, they are build for steep approaches. The one funny thing is, that there is no early attempt to send the Jumbolino in a pattern to let it descend slower and when it came, the pilot said "negative" and used radically the abilities of his plane for that kind of approach. So I am not sure where this graphics with the pattern comes from, but the ATC tape doesn't mention patterns. To be sure, maybe can listen to it again, maybe I missed there something.
The other thing is, this video mentions the range of a Jumbolino with 1700 miles and says, the distance of the flight is 1600 miles. Sals, there seems to be unit mess up. 1700mi convert to roughly 1480nm, which is actually the range of a BAe-146-100. The BAe-146-200 and the RJ85 have a little more, 1570nm range. The 1600 miles on the other hand seems to real nautical miles. So, Medellin was for a fully loaded EJ85 in fact out of the official range to begin with, but with only 77 persons on bord, even with 81, she could have made it and would have touched the FAA reserves basically when they entered the Medellin area. Which is exactly what the pilot said on the ATC tape "at the moment, we are on reserve".

The A320 ... well, we know, Airbuses are the root of all evil and thus, this one had to be guilty in some hard to describe way, right? Now, given, that this time slice is actually wrong because there is nothing on the type indicating the RJ85 were ordered to hold patterns and that we actually hear the pilot saying, he sees the traffic ahead and below, we know pretty sure, those two planes were near and on the same course, but the RJ was on FL210 at this time and started a steep descend, the A320 was in approach and about FL135 at this time. So, obviously, even she gave no explicit explanation, the ATC knew her planes. Which is probably the reason she didn't panic when the Jumbolino dropped a quick 2000 fet in a few seconds. Those birds do that (and my FDM in FG is not half as good at that then the real one). So, if I assume, this ATC lady knew her planes, she also knew, the Airbus woudl got for a landing speed of around 145knots, give or take. The RJ85, with full flaps out after the steep descend would make max 120knots, given she was light and in fuel problems, probably only 110. So, she pokered that the Airbus would land clean and leave the runway fast, but then, even if not, the Jumbolino doesn't need that much runway. There simply no way, the Airbus would be able to fly slower than the Jumbolino and to stop the A320 on the runway before the runway distance, the Jumbolino would need to stop.
Thus, the only thing, we can blame the A320 for is the additional stress it caused for the ATC lady, but that would be only relevant if she would have made any doubtful decisions or clear mistakes, but I don't see any. Stress or not, she did all she could possibly do.

The third thing is the no-transponder. That is obviously right. She has to ask the pilot for his altitude. Th4e interesting thing is, he has an answer for her. So some instrument worked still. And he had definitively at least partially electricity. He was able to change the course AFTER he declared, he has total power loss. But it also makes another thing clear. When he said, his altitude is 9000ft, what exactly did he mean? He had heard the QNH, 30.27, earlier when the ATC instructed the Airbus. But did he actually set that on his pressure controlled altimeter? The Jumbolinos have no radar altimeter except for some few that were modernized. Because what, if he has his altimeter still on 29.92? He came down from 21,000ft in a hurry, did he have the time to set it, especially since all he had was information given to another flight, not his own? Now, a higher pressure means, the altimeter shows a lower altitude. Means on the other hand, if his altimeter was still on 29.92 but the real QNH was 30.27 (quite high anyway for bad weather and that high?), his altitude was shown higher than it actually was. So, 9000 feet were maybe only 8500? Maybe even a little less? We have to find the equation or experiment a little, but it put him definitively at an altitude under the upper ridge of Cerro Gordo.

Take a look at the roder of events, there is the point, I scratch my head. He asks for vectors as soon as he gets in range of the ATC. She gives him vectors, two times. But that is BEFORE he declares he had lost his electric, at a time, he should have been able to home in on RNG with radio nav. But he was obviously not able, but he didn't mention why. And he tells about the electric failure only later. So, what was wrong here? Did they set the nav1 to some wrong frequency? Was there an obstacle or some radio disturbance preventing them to get the signal (highly unlikely, he had no signal when ha was already right above RNG) or was the radio nav even fully working? Maybe some Spanish speaker can look whether there are real ATC recordings from the time, the Jumbolonie made the two course changes short after crossing the Brazilean border and then 100 miles or so later. I wonder whether this was also vectored or whether he actually used the radio navigation there.

However, to dismiss another piece of bull out of this story: The plane was an Avro RJ85, with the serial number E.2348. She was almost 18 years old and she has been before in Mesaba and Cityline (two airlines, not three as often reported). She had been also not just un-mothballed. She had been in storage between 2010 and somewhere late September or very early October 2013. She was in service since three years, not just unpacked for this flight as some reporter wrote.
There is also mentioned, that she was out of the three RJ85s, LaMia owns, she was the only one flyable. The number seems to be correct, but one of them arrived on Nov. 27 in Cochambra for D-Check as it looks and she did so on her own power. So, deeper digging needed, but it seems, the reporting early on seems more interesting in aiming to blame the airline than on fact reporting.

[KL-666]

I start to get the picture of the descend profile, and see that the flame out occurred at one of the worst possible moments.

When they started the descent, they still thought to land with engines, so they went for the normal profile: 10.000 ft at VOR RNG. They wanted to land quick, so they went straight to RNG in a steep descent from fl 210. Therefore they had to throw out all anchors: Gear went down immediate at the start of desc (audible on atc), flaps were probably full out (check the picture of the wreckage). And possibly the air brakes were out too.

If you check the seconds from 16.000 ft till the "total failure" announcement, at the rate of desc Jwocky calculated, they must have been at some 12.000 ft just before the VOR, in a very bad configuration for gliding. To make the distance to the airport gliding from there, they must cleanup their configuration. Retract gear and flaps. Yet they did not do that. Flaps out can be seen on the wreckage picture. No wonder that they were at 9000 ft in no time. That is really low for the terrain at the VOR.

Had they cleaned their configuration immediate at flame out, they might have made it. 12.000 ft -> 7000 ft gliding a 10 mi distance must be doable. But still, the moment of flame out was very inconvenient and stressful. Had they flamed out earlier, before the steep descent, then they would have had plenty of alt and time to plan their actions.

Kind regards, Vincent

[IAHM-COL]

So I am not sure where this graphics with the pattern comes from, but the ATC tape doesn't mention patterns. To be sure, maybe can listen to it again, maybe I missed there something.

I think I know the answer to this one.
The Tape begins later after CP2933 is already established on RNG hold.

viewtopic.php?f=21&t=904&start=10#p17535

Notice this.
This AvroRJ85 is originally coming from Viru-Viru Bolivia way South of Medellin, so much of its transit was North-Bound.
But when the ATC_tape first mention heading of this plane, (time in video: 1:06 ) the heading is the expected heading south-bound of the out-going leg of the RNG holding.
So basically, I interpret, that when the ATC tape began, the LMI2933 was already established in the holding, and had not declared emergency yet.

ATC: LMI2933, say heading
LMI2933: 179 outbound leg

From there we notice that in this transmission, LMI2933 IS heading south. And in an outbound leg.
This is consistent with the RNG holding.

Thus, it seems that he requested "priority" already established holding.
and saying "oubound leg" and at 179 does clearly indicate he is holding RNG as charted.

Now, this is the other thing. I don't want to come overcritical of the pilot, now he is deceased. But I find discomfort on how unclear he was upon the seriousness of his situation. The ATC, nonetheless, gave immediate service and got everything ready for him, on a very difficult night, when the A320 had just landed for emergency like 2 min ago, in a rainy day. Wet rwy, very low vis.

ATC (2:04): How much time do you have for landing LMI?

She is actually unsure of the situation there. The pilot is declaring priority. Not an emergency (MAYDAYMAYDAY).

Even the Avianca pilot calls confused about the way the ATC starts treating LMI as EMERGENCY and giving everyone a vector out. She even cancelled one pilot's landing to give LMI a fighting chance

ATC: AVA9771, turn immediately left 270
AVA9771 (3:12): left heading 270 AVA9771 Confirm: has the other traffic already declared emergency?!

And about two minute later, mark 4:47 he declared a plane totally dark.
The ATC had the rwy ready for him already. AVA9771 had left the approach to the left. and she declared emergency vehicle on their way for ground assistance.

[IAHM-COL]

Had they cleaned their configuration immediate at flame out, they might have made it. 12.000 ft -> 7000 ft gliding a 10 mi distance must be doable. But still, the moment of flame out was very inconvenient and stressful. Had they flamed out earlier, before the steep descent, then they would have had plenty of alt and time to plan their actions.

Kind regards, Vincent

You description above of the configuration of the AvroRJ85, the profile descend, and how this impacted negatively their ability to glide to RWY: Sounds all correct to me.

I also noticed the pilot despair on uncertainty. "Vectors, Se~orita, Vectors".

She let him know he needed to glide 8.2 nm more. He prob. never got those words. The course (heading) was overall correct.

9000 at the VOR is tree-scratching altitude already. creepy .

[IAHM-COL]

You description above of the configuration of the AvroRJ85, the profile descend, and how this impacted negatively their ability to glide to RWY: Sounds all correct to me.

Furthermore, had he cleared Cerro-Gordo, he would have had less complex terrain ahead, and even maybe get a visibility of the runway.

In addition, if he crashed closer to the airport, on the mountain table top, that also would have expedited rescue operations, which could have increased the number of survivors, too.
The rescue operations on the south side of Cerro-Gordo was yet another dark to pile to the tragedy. Very complex terrain. 30 min walking to a 80 deg hill to reach a Colombian AirForce Helicopter to mobilize people with injuries.

Fate -- piling against.

[KL-666]

Very good seen about the ATC woman, Israel. She could not have been of any better help to that plane. Even treating it as an emergency, while the pilot refuses to declare an emergency. That other pilot inquiring about whether an emergency was declared must have been really pissed off at her at that moment, making him get home later for nothing.

This woman deserves a medal for efficient conduct. But what does she get? Death threats. At least that is what i heard is written in this open letter of hers.



Kind regards, Vincent

[IAHM-COL]

I read that earlier before.
It upsets me, in this time of mourning.
As it upsets me D-ECHO asking which life is more important than anyone other.

My whole support is not only with the Chapecoense, but also with Miss YM.

[SkyBoat]

Has someone translated this into English? I recognized just enough of the Spanish words to recognize it is written by a person who is dealing with a great deal of anquish after the event in which she was the ATC for those flights.

It is too bad there isn't a way we might be able to send her a letter expressing our condolences. Of course at this point we don't know how the Columbian Air Traffic authorities will evaluate her actions as the ATC. Those findings probably will not be known for weeks or months.

[IAHM-COL]

Of course at this point we don't know how the Columbian Air Traffic authorities will evaluate her actions as the ATC.

Yes. We know.

http://www.elheraldo.co/colombia/contro ... mio-307393

El vicepresidente de la Asociación Colombiana de Controladores de Tránsito Aéreo (Acdecta), Carlos Ferney Llanos Bernal, se pronunció este jueves sobre la labor realizada por Yaneth Molina, controladora aérea que tuvo contacto con el capitán del avión, minutos antes del accidente que se registró en la noche de este lunes en el sector Cerro Gordo del municipio de La Unión (Antioquia).

Manifestó que Molina –quien se encuentra afectada y ha preferido no hablar sobre el tema– “actuó profesionalmente”.

“Ella tuvo la valentía de mantener la entereza en las comunicaciones. De verdad que ella es casi un héroe para separar los aviones inmediatamente cuando entendió la emergencia que tenía la aeronave de Lamia. Profesionalmente, tuvo una actuación especial”, resaltó Llanos en diálogo con Blue Radio.

Translating (IH-COL)

The vicepresident of the Colombian Association of Air Traffic Controllers (Acdecta), Carlos Ferney Llanos Bernal, pronounced this Thursday over the work of YM, Air Controller that was in contact with the Captain Pilot of the aircraft, minutes before the accident that occurred during Monday Night in the area Cerro Gordo of the Municipality of La Union (Antioquia).

He manifested that YM -who is emotionally affected and who has preferred not to speak about the topic- "acted professionally".

"She had the courage of keep integrity of the communications. Truly she is like a Hero that was able to separate the aircrafts immediately as she understood the emergency on the aircraft of Lamia. Professionally, she had a remarkable performance.", Llanos underlined in dialogs with Blue Radio